

9 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Major General Lew Allen, Jr.
D/DCI/IC

FROM : Mr. William E. Nelson
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : NIO/USIB Interface

1. The interested DDO components have reviewed the draft of your memorandum with the above subject, and we offer the following comments.

2. There seems to be no self-evidently compelling reason for the institution of an NIO office to necessitate the geographical restructuring of USIB. Indeed, there are often advantages to the complementary relations between geographical and functional elements.

3. The NIO, as originally described in a Memorandum to USIB members, could serve to relate customer needs to production responses and could conceivably operate within the stipulation not to cut across normal command channels within the Community or within the Agency (between the DCI and his Deputies, or between the Deputies and their operating divisions). An NIO with chairmanship of a major USIB element, with production responsibility, and with a charter to report on effectiveness and sufficiency of resources, is a much grander beast of a different sort. A potential danger is that the NIO equipped with a USIB committee focusing on production demand and resource allocation might become a "customer's man" for White House/OMB and short-cut the DCI role in coordinating national intelligence activities. Certainly an NIO, in his own role, and additionally as chairman of a main USIB committee, as coordinator of production, as referent on resource allocation, will be presumably both busy and powerful and come into conflict with command channels. For these reasons we think that the NIO, as originally described and as replacing the Board of National Estimates, could be effectively supported by line elements and by USIB as presently organized and functioning.

4. Changes could be made in the USIB structure for other reasons and, for example, we see no difficulty in the suggestion that the Interagency

Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC) and the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC) be subsumed under a Human Sources Committee if, as seems appropriate and as you recommend, DDO chairs such a committee. As to CCPC, experience might indicate the advisability of the Director retaining some such "permanent ad hoc" committee for those problems that do not fall within the boundaries of one primary committee or that cross the boundaries of several.



William E. Nelson
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

25X1

EX-100 11 01 09

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

10 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence,
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : NIO/USIB Interface

1. This responds to your request for comments on your 7 August memorandum to the DCI on the NIO/USIB Interface.
2. Your memorandum presents a constructive approach to the single proposition of merging your earlier proposal for a new USIB Committee structure with that of the NIO concept as proposed by the DCI. I view this as an option that deserves consideration but regard it as premature at this time.
3. I believe it would be preferable to move forward with the DCI's proposal for the appointment of National Intelligence Officers and allow them to gain experience and test the concept by working with and through the existing USIB Committee structure and normal command channels. The operation of the NIO system should be reviewed after several months, particularly with respect to the relationship between the NIO's and USIB. That would provide a sounder basis for determining what adjustments and relationships are required.
4. The merit of this more deliberate and evolutionary approach rests on several factors: The DCI faces two major tasks of (1) improving the interface and responsiveness of his intelligence production responsibilities to the National Security Council and its staffs, and (2) implementing the Presidential

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

order to provide active direction to the management of intelligence resources. Conceptually, the NIO approach should help achieve the accomplishment of the first of these tasks. It is clearly intended to provide the Director with senior staff assistance from substantive experts who will be able to generate coordinated responses to scheduled and unscheduled needs for intelligence in support of national level requirements.

5. Your proposal to marshal USIB capabilities to support the NIO's may be one way to implement the DCI's NIO concept, but it has some shortcomings. It could overburden the NIO with the formidable management responsibilities even before the NIO concept has had an opportunity to prove itself. Moreover, it seems to give the NIO structure, as I understand it, a greater role in intelligence resource responsibilities than the DCI may intend. I also believe that we should not undertake such an extensive restructuring of the USIB mechanism until there is more evidence that this is necessary or desirable. In short, your proposal may be broadening the scope of responsibilities of the NIO's and encumbering them with bureaucratic responsibilities to such an extent that their ability to concentrate on matters of substance would be seriously diluted.

6. With regard to the DCI's second task of providing intelligence resource management, the mechanism to assist him may be still evolving. It is evident, however, that the IC Staff, much of the existing USIB structure, and certainly IRAC, could be harnessed to meet the challenge without imposing resource management responsibilities on the NIO. Before proceeding apace, the relationship of the NIO, as you envision him, to both IRAC and the IC Staff needs to be defined carefully and, we believe, concurrently.

7. Aside from these broader issues, I would like to raise some specific points in your memorandum. Many of our apparent differences may not be significant in themselves but they do suggest the need for further discussion. Perhaps the Management Committee would be an appropriate forum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

- Your key paragraph number four on the role of the NIO's Committee requires clarification. The degree of authority implied by the phrase "oversee the coordination" should be thoroughly discussed. We also need to give more thought to how the inevitable inter-area competition for resources among NIO's will be resolved.
- The definition of the role of Support Groups raises the question of whether the responsibility for economic intelligence properly should reside in one of the primary committees. National Estimates solely concerning economic matters are rare and, therefore, the economic intelligence functions of USIB could be vested in an Economic Support Group. Economic intelligence is predominately the work of one office and the present EIC arrangement is working well enough.
- I agree that the Human Sources Committee (or Support Group) could subsume the functions of the IPC, but it would be inappropriate for a single collection component, the DDO, to hold the chairmanship. When the Human Sources Committee was created, the DDO wisely elected not to seek either the chair or CIA membership. This principle should hold for all collection systems and should apply specifically to the SIGINT Committee.
- The amalgamation of the disparate expertise of GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC into a single Support Group may be desirable. On the other hand, it does appear unnecessary and possibly not an efficient vehicle in which to involve several extensive groups of experts, but I would defer to the DDS&T on this subject.

[Redacted Signature]

PAUL V. WALSH
Acting Deputy Director
for Intelligence

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

7 AUG 1975

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIO/USIB Interface

1. Your decision to establish NIOs will undoubtedly raise questions in the community concerning interface with USIB. Specifically, there will be a question of the relationship of the NIO concept to the earlier proposal on the USIB committee structure.

2. Basically, the NIO concept subsumes and voids key aspects of the USIB Committee restructure proposal. ICS has completely reviewed the USIB committee proposal and revised the recommendations to accord with the NIO concept. Our review took into account the proposed changes to the NIOs in your memorandum to USIB and the USIB substantive objectives paper (key intelligence questions) which you approved in principle. It was our intent to retain the valuable aspects of community coordination in the current USIB structure while reinforcing USIB's ability to deal with a new emphasis on the prime function of establishing requirements and priorities for its collective production and collection resources.

3. Primary committees. Nine committees should be formed corresponding to the NIOs proposed, with the NIO as chairman. The NIO, plus representatives of the primary producing agencies--CIA, DIA and INR--should form the basic committee membership with additional membership appropriate to subject matter at the option of the NIO. A tenth primary committee should be a Security Committee with a representative from each USIB agency chaired by a DCI representative. (As in the case of NIOs, the chairman should have this function as his sole duty.)

4. These committees would respond to NSCIC and DCI guidance in the production of estimates (NIEs, NIAMs, and NSSM inputs). The NIO would utilize the committee to assign responsibilities to USIB members for inputs and oversee the coordination of products and reports. The committees would also respond to key intelligence questions (KIQs) levied by NSCIC and DCI, evaluating USIB application of production,

processing and collection resources against substantive problems. Overall, however, the most important function of these committees would be to make periodic reports, perhaps quarterly, on the effectiveness and sufficiency of resources applied to intelligence problems in their areas of responsibility. The Security Committee would respond to DCI and USIB on matters of protection of methods, foreign releases, compartmentation, and those matters previously handled by TSCC.

5. USIB Support Groups. The functions of the current collection system oriented USIB committees (COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Sources Committee) would be retained. However, the functions of these committees is fundamentally different from those of the primary committees. Under the proposed NIO/USIB committee concept, the functions of the collection system oriented committees would be supportive of the primary committees. The support would be essentially in the area of advice on collection strategies, in consolidation of requirements and priorities by collection system, and on specific security problems. The day-to-day interface with collection system managers (NSA, etc.) would not change appreciably. As a result of these differences, we propose that the current committees be renamed as support groups, i.e., IREX Support Group, SIGINT Support Group and Human Sources Support Group. The latter would subsume the functions of the IPC and the DRC as subelements of the human resources management function.

ILLEGIB

6. We propose one additional support group to provide foreign scientific and technical support to the primary committees--the Foreign S&T Support Group. This group would subsume the functions of GMAIC, JAEIC and SIC. It would respond primarily to the needs of the Strategic Weapons/SALT NIO, but to the other NIOs as well. (In the case of JAEIC, a minor change to an NSCID would be required.)

7. The USIB Support Groups can be organized in two fundamentally different ways: they can be headed up by "sole-duty" DCI representatives similar to NIOs with staff provided by the USIB members and the O/DCI, or they can be made functions of appropriate Agency offices. In the latter case, COMIREX can be administered and operated by DDI, SIGINT Committee by NSA, Human Sources by DDO, and Foreign Science and Technology by DDS&T or OSI.

ILLEGIB

8. A choice need not be made soon with regard to COMIREX and the SIGINT Committees. Their names can be changed and their relationships to the primary committees clarified, leaving matters of chairmanship, manning responsibility and reporting chain for future decision. The merging of the various human resource committees into one Support Group with a DDO chairman and the merging of the technical committees under a DDS&T chairman can also be accomplished without further decision at this time.

ILLEGIB

9. Other Committees. The above actions (or options) can be adopted without specific disposition of other current USIB Committees. If the general concept is adopted, the disposition of other committees can be worked out in detail so as to retain useful features of the current structure. In that light, the following suggestions are less recommendations than observations:

a. Economic Intelligence Committee: The functions of this committee are absorbed in the NIO structure.

b. Watch Committee: The eventual disposition of this committee will be contingent upon the results of ongoing actions to improve warning and crisis reporting systems.

c. NIS Committee: In light of recent disestablishment of the NIS program by USIB, this committee can be terminated.

d. Intelligence Information Handling Committee: The function of this committee requires such close coordination with DCI/IC that its permanent staff could be transferred to ICS. However, USIB member representation should continue.

e. Critical Collection Problems Committee: Since the primary NIO/USIB committees will examine collection problems in their areas of responsibility, there will be no further need for a separate CCPC.

10. If the above expansion on your NIO concept is acceptable to you, I recommend that a follow-up memorandum to USIB be forwarded soon, as it could have considerable impact on responses to your invitation of nominations for NIOs.

25X1

R.S. We have reviewed your comments on an earlier paper on this subject which we rec'd today. I believe this scheme is in consonance with your views. We agree that NIO's should not become producers of NIE's etc. see TP 4.

Lew Allen, Jr.
Major General, USAF
Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence
Community Staff

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3

Next 20 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210016-3